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1 Introduction
Some recently introduced institutional arrangements in the Romanian higher edu-
cation system aimed at increasing the quality of both research and teaching, while
also providing incentives to Romanian universities for a better connection to the
international stream of research and ideas. These arrangements have been set to drive
the Romanian higher education system from a traditionally praised Humboldtian
model, where research and teaching are harmoniously combined within each and
every university, towards a model in which one might identify a differentiation based
on the division of labour among universities, that is research-oriented universities
versus teaching-oriented universities (Shin and Toutkoushian 2011). This key
rationale of such a change addressed the need of universities to grow their spe-
cialized competences as to effectively and efﬁciently spend the rather scarce public
resources, while relying on existing and prospective faculty.
We build on Schwarz and Teichler (2002) perspective that institutional frame-
work determines, to a large extent, the theoretical and methodological standards that
higher education research strives for or achieves. Moreover, as Mace (1995) showed,
new funding mechanisms are expected to change the behaviour of academics, both
in terms of teaching and research. Consequently, our view is that the quality of
research productivity is affected not only by the funding levels, but also by the
incentives conveyed by the institutional arrangements governing the higher educa-
tion system. As argued by Estermann and Pruvot (2011), diversity in the funding
structure is an important condition for universities to achieve ﬁnancial sustainability.
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While public funding is an important income source for Romanian universities,
recently introduced incentives are expected to determine universities to seek out
additional funding sources. However, we show that university income diversiﬁcation
and higher levels of funding are not the only drivers for higher quality in research.
The introduction of performance criteria in the allocation of public funding should
act as a driving force towards an increase in research productivity and its impact.
In the ﬁrst section of this paper, we briefly analyze the legal arrangements
recently provisioned within the Romanian higher education, from an institutional
analysis perspective. We stress the most important changes brought forth from a
manifold perspective: academic career, quality assurance and funding. In the
second section, we shortly discuss the idea of scientiﬁc productivity, suggesting that
citations and citation-based formulae (i.e. H-index and G-index) are acceptable
tools for the measurement of research impact. Eventually, we report and discuss the
ﬁndings produced after analyzing the scientiﬁc productivity of two classes of
Romanian university departments (i.e. Sociology; Political Science and
International Relations). We conclude by suggesting that an increase in the quality
of research productivity is due to a combination of income diversiﬁcation and
funding growth, with institutional incentives that stress performance criteria.
2 Institutional Arrangements Within Romanian Higher
Education
2.1 The Problem of Increasing Research Productivity
When approaching issues related to academic quality and research productivity in
higher education systems similar to the Romanian one, at least two streams of ideas
may be pointed out. On the one hand, there is a dominant stream that builds on the
idea that public expenditures or public funding would necessary yield academic
quality and research productivity enhancement. The best way of growing research
productivity and academic quality would be that of increasing the flow of ﬁnancial
resources. There is also a rather marginal stream of ideas that works with the
assumption that research productivity and impact could be improved by increasing
the level of efﬁciency in spending public funding. In other words, academic quality
and research productivity could be increased by holding the public funding constant
while improving the mechanisms for a more efﬁcient exploitation of the existing
resources. From such a perspective, speciﬁc incentives and institutional arrange-
ments are needed in order to determine a signiﬁcant increase in the efﬁciency of
spending the same quantity of ﬁnancial resources.
These two streams of ideas may be considered as complementary. From such a
perspective, we put forward a model in which we merge the need for increasing
public funding with those incentives that would lead to an increase in the efﬁciency
of spending input resources (such as funding).
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As to test the model, we choose to provide a case study focused on the recent
reforms in the Romanian higher education system. The reforms provisioned after
2011 have been legally set out for increasing the level of efﬁciency in spending
public funding made available for academic research and teaching (see the Law of
Education no. 1/2011).
Within Romanian tertiary education and R&D sector, increasing expenditure
trends can be identiﬁed (as shown in Fig. 1), even if these are particularly small
compared with other EU countries, and despite the provisions of the current
Romanian Law of Education (according to the Romanian Law of Education,
minimum 6 % of GDP ought to have been allocated in 2012 as expenditure on
tertiary education and at least 1 % of GDP as expenditure on R&D).
Given the expenditure trends (Fig. 1), the scientiﬁc productivity reported for the
same time framework also increased. For instance, the increasing trend of publi-
cations within the ﬁeld of Romanian sociology (as shown in Fig. 2). The data
plotted in Fig. 2 were collected using Publish or Perish software tool (Harzing
2007) and refers to the scientiﬁc productivity of the academics working full-time
within Romanian departments of sociology.
The Law of Education (no. 1/2011) provided the legal basis for important
reforms in the Romanian education system: new institutions for the selection and
Fig. 1 Increasing expenditure trends, within Romania, on tertiary education and on R&D, as % of
GDP. Note The plotted data were collected from Eurostat. The numbers for 2012 are computed
based on ofﬁcial datasets reported by the Ministry of Public Finance of Romania
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recruitment of academic staff, a new mechanism of university funding, a new
philosophy of higher education quality assurance and evaluation, a new arrange-
ment for enhancing the institutional capacity of universities.
2.2 The Academic Career
By recognizing the need for auditing institutional policies focused on academic and
research staff, the Council on University Qualiﬁcations and Degrees (CNATDCU)
has formally introduced new quality evaluation mechanisms and schema. The new
policy of staff development has thus rendered a shift from the traditional policy to a
post-traditional one. While the traditional approach, in Romania, was based on
principles of in-breeding localism and academic gerontocracy, considering
age/seniority as the key element in the process of job recruitment and appointment,
the post-traditional one relies entirely on peer-reviewed academic performances and
scientometric outputs. The post-traditional approach is meant to be meritocratic,
highlighting the knowledge productivity internationally acknowledged. For
instance, according to the reforms provisioned in 2011, academic and research staff
recruitment and promotion have had to take into account individual performances
measured by speciﬁc criteria, such as: publications impact (e.g. number of citations,
Fig. 2 The increasing trend of publications within the ﬁeld of Romanian Sociology
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G-index and H-index scores), number of publications (e.g. papers, books, book
chapters etc.) included in internationally indexed databases etc. This post-traditional
policy approach of providing new ways of moving up onto the academic career
ladder ignores age and considers the ability of academics and researchers to con-
nect, by excellence in research, to international flows of ideas and research com-
munities. Under the given context, the policy expectation is that the new selection
procedures would ﬁlter the occupational mobility and orient the academic career
ladder towards breeding internationally recognized performance and originality.
2.3 The Quality Assurance Process
Concerning the quality assurance procedures, Romanian Agency for Quality
Assurance in Higher Education (ARACIS), using the ACADEMIS project as a
vehicle, has made several proposals for redeﬁning the quality assurance criteria and
indicators. These proposals have aimed at changing the traditional philosophy of
quality assurance and evaluation from an input oriented approach to the one which
is highly standardized and relying mostly on results, particularly learning outcomes.
The new philosophy is process-oriented and, especially, output/outcome oriented,
matching European and international trends (Stensaker 2011). Stressing the process
and the output/outcome features of higher education have been thought of as an
adequate means for increasing the educational process efﬁciency and efﬁcacy, while
also providing wider and proper opportunities for an improved exploitation of the
existing inputs into the process. Given the new quality assurance framework, a
certain degree of resistance is expected on the part of some universities that lack the
institutional capacity of adjusting their internal processes to the new institutional
requirements. Within the near future, the problem of circumscribing this resistance
remains open, while lessons learned from other reported cases (Beach 2013) might
become relevant.
2.4 The University Classiﬁcation Exercise
and the Introduction of Performance Criteria
The most radical change produced by the 2011 Law of Education has been rep-
resented by the University Classiﬁcation and Study Program Ranking Exercise.
That was a national evaluation exercise which aimed: (a) to break the systemically
in-built institutional isomorphism which kept hidden to stakeholders basic infor-
mation on the differentiation of universities, and (b) to provide opportunities for
emerging a more institutionally diverse system of higher education. There has also
been an instrumental objective, in the sense that the university evaluation exercise
sought to differentiate among universities based on their institutional mission and
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performance. Consequently, Romanian universities have been classiﬁed into three
distinct classes: advanced research universities, research and teaching universities,
and teaching oriented universities. Furthermore, all university study programs were
ranked. For instance, within the sociology ranking domain or within the mathe-
matics ranking domain etc., all the corresponding study programs existing in the
Romanian higher education system have been ranked into ﬁve ordinal classes (from
the class A to class E).
These two outputs—institutional classiﬁcation and study programs ranking—are
to be highly flexible in time, so as to allow universities and study programs to
evolve both within and between classes and ranks according to their academic and
research performing outcomes. They have been intended to facilitate the institu-
tional development of universities, enhance their quality assurance mechanisms,
increase the quality of university internal operations and processes, and correct the
informational asymmetry between universities and prospective students or stake-
holders. The evaluation exercise has thus sought also to accomplish a substantial
objective: that of providing universities with the necessary and accurate mecha-
nisms for a better understanding and establishment of their own institutional mis-
sion and strategic development.
Both objectives have had salient expected consequences for Romanian higher
education. The accomplishment of the instrumental objective has been expected to
correct the informational asymmetry (e.g. with respect to prospective students
awareness regarding the quality of educational services provided by universities).
Put it simpler, different types of beneﬁciaries (e.g. prospective students, alumni,
employers etc.) were expected to have the proper means to evaluate university study
programs in terms of performance and, incidentally, to make informed choices.
Moreover, even universities have been expected to have a clear and sound image of
their own levels of scientiﬁc and teaching performance levels. Also, the accom-
plishment of the substantial objective would enhance universities’ capabilities of
attaining reflexivity. This reflexivity is expected to raise awareness with respect to
the institutional mission, strategic action setting and community involvement.
2.5 The New Public Funding Mechanism
According to the reform, institutional arrangements, the public funding streams are
to be correlated with the results produced by the university evaluation exercise (i.e.
university classiﬁcation and study program ranking). For instance, public funding
should be so oriented as to take into consideration how university study programs
perform (i.e. their position within each ranking domain). This principle of ﬁnancing
performance in both teaching and research rests on the idea of spending public
resources more efﬁciently. Public funding streams should concentrate especially on
those universities and university study programs that entail higher levels of quality
in teaching and research (e.g. university study programs that hold top positions
within each ranking domain, be that in teaching and/or in research, are expected to
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receive more public funding, whereas university study programs poorly ranked
either lose their public funding, or receive less ﬁnancing for respectively research
and/or teaching). This mechanism is expected to produce competition among
universities and specialized study programs at the level of higher education system,
and to forge the required incentives/payoffs to better structure university organi-
zational environments. Within this type of institutional landscape, universities are
predicted to orient their human resource strategies on appointing highly competitive
academic staff and to consider improving and even removing that study programs
that poorly perform (i.e. to cut off their losses). Though criticized, the idea of
competitive funding seems to be a common feature for many worldwide higher
education reforms (Marginson 2013).
Such reform policies, provisioned in 2011 with respect to academic staff
recruitment and promotion, quality assurance, university classiﬁcation, study pro-
gram ranking or public ﬁnancing, are expected to conduct the Romanian higher
education system into increasing the level of efﬁciency in spending public funding.
3 Methodology
3.1 Research Productivity and Its Impact
We shall here focus on the research area, leaving teaching for a later demonstration.
When measuring research productivity and impact, various scientometric tools are
available. Firstly, one may seek to measure academics and departments’ number of
journal papers, books, book chapters, patents etc. The highlight is thus on the
quantity of publications from which one may estimate the scholar and/or depart-
ment’s research productivity (Johnes 1988). A larger number of published scientiﬁc
items in a given unit of time would mean a higher level of individual research
productivity. However, there are many drawbacks when using this approach. The
most important one is that a scholar could publish a large number of publications,
but without any real scientiﬁc impact, due to their low quality and lack of interest
for other researchers. Such a drawback might be compensated by measuring the
impact of a scholar’s work in terms of citations (Shin and Toutkoushian 2011). In
this paper, we consider citations as an acceptable measure for the quality and impact
of research productivity, in spite of the controversies and discussions on its pros and
cons (Toutkoushian 1994; Toutkoushian et al. 2003).
For illustrating such an approach, we consider the relationship between research
productivity and academic quality impact by looking at the G-index and H-index
scores (Egghe 2006a, b; Egghe and Rousseau 2008; Hirsch 2005; Woeginger
2008). Although G-index, H-index and other similar indices have been developed
as tools for ranking journals, scholars or university departments, in this paper we
refer to these formulae for other purposes. We treat G-index and H-index scores as
proxies for estimating the impact of funding on academics’ research productivity in
two speciﬁc Romanian ﬁelds: Sociology and Political Science & International
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Relations. Citations, G-index and H-index scores are measured both at an individual
and departmental level, within the same discipline, building on previous similar
research studies (Becher 1994; Feldman 1987). We keep the model simple, ignoring
other factors that determine or affect scientiﬁc productivity, such as, for instance,
personal career preferences, human capital, teaching workload (Porter and Umbach
2001; Webber 2011).
3.2 Methods
We used Publish or Perish software (Harzing 2007) to measure the impact of the
Romanian academics’ research productivity as this is distributed in two disciplinary
domains. We collected G-index and H-index scores for all scholars working in the
Romanian university departments of Political Science and International Relations
(hereafter PS&IR) and Sociology (Table 1). The human resource composition of the
40 university departments was established using ofﬁcial data reports provided by
ARACIS.
When considering the G-index and H-index scores, our stress was not on
assessing their ranking potential, but on their descriptive guise, exploring the
possible relationships between these results and the public funding mechanisms.
We were thus interested in investigating whether increasing research funding would
be positively associated with an increase in research productivity and its impact.
3.3 Data Analysis and Results
The distributions of individual G-index and H-index scores, split on ranking
domains (i.e. Sociology and PS&IR), are available in Figs. 3 and 4. Inspecting the
box-and-whiskers plots, one could notice that 50 % of the academic staff working in
the departments of PS&IR and Sociology have a G-index score and a H-index score
of zero. Put it differently, half of the academics in the Romanian departments of
Sociology and PS&IR have publications that almost no one ever cited (or, at least,
there is no ﬁle—e.g. paper, book, magazine article etc., indexed by the Google
Table 1 Population of scholars within the Romanian university departments of sociology and of
political science and international relations
Academic ranking domain Number of university
departments
Number of full time working
scholars/academics





23 out of 23 accredited
university departments
492
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Fig. 3 Individual G-index score distributions for scholars working within university departments
of two ranking domains: Political Science and International Relations, and Sociology
Fig. 4 Individual H-index score distributions for scholars working within university departments
of two ranking domains: Political Science and International Relations, and Sociology
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browser, that cites the scientiﬁc work published by the people working in the
Romanian departments of Sociology and PS&IR). The top 25 % of the academics
have a G-index and H-index score range of three, between two and ﬁve. Outliers are
present in the score distributions and point out that there are some scholars whose
work is more influential, seminal and have a greater impact (e.g. there is a G-index
score outlier of 22 for PS&IR and of 27 for Sociology).
Male scholars have better G-index and H-index scores than female scholars,
irrespective of the ranking domain (median = 1 for males and median = 0 for
females), but a higher variation (S.D. = 2.1 for males and 1.4 for females).
Although the difference between the two medians is extremely small, this could still
be explained by the fact that the time spent in the system by male scholars is longer
than the time spent by women. That is, in the university departments of Sociology
and of PS&IR, male scholars tend to occupy higher academic ranks (professors and
associate professors). The relationship between sex and academic ranks is stressed
by Pearson’s chi-square test: in case of Sociology ranking domain, χ2 = 18, df = 4,
p = 0.00, and in the case of PS&IR, χ2 = 38, df = 4, p = 0.00. We also uncovered a
positive correlation between the academic ranks (i.e. the period spent within the
higher education system, as, until recently, the climbing on the academic ladder in
Romania has been gerontocratic) and H-index scores (τ = 0.475, p = 0.01, for
Sociology, and τ = 0.450, p = 0.01, for PS&IR) or G-index scores (τ = 0.469,
p = 0.01, for Sociology, and τ = 0.443, p = 0.01, for PS&IR). It follows that male
scholars score better than women and they hold the highest academic positions (i.e.
professors and associate professors).
We wanted to control the time influence over the G-index and H-index score
distributions. For doing so, we took into account only the scientiﬁc items published
after 2006. We did this exercise for the Sociology ranking domain and the empirical
ﬁndings suggest two things. Firstly, there is a positive relationship between the
distribution of G-index scores and the distribution of G-index scores computed for
publications published after 2006 in sociology (τ = 0.806, p = 0.01). There is also a
positive relationship between the distribution of H-index scores and the distribution
of H-index scores computed for publications published after 2006 (τ = 0.821,
p = 0.01). Secondly, there is also a positive relationship between academic titles and
G-index score distribution computed for publications published after 2006
(τ = 0.371, p = 0.01). Even if the relationship between academic titles and G-index
scores computed for publications published after 2006 is smaller than the correla-
tion between academic titles and G-index score distribution (without time referral),
it shows that professors and associate professor still have a scientiﬁc work with a
larger impact (Table 2).
The differences among academic titles are smaller when compared using
G-index and H-index scores computed for publications published after 2006, than
when compared using G-index and H-index scores (computed without time refer-
ral). This idea is shown in Figs. 5 and 6, where one might inspect the differences
among academic titles in terms of G-index and H-index mean scores, within the
Romanian Sociology ranking domains.
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Fig. 5 Comparing individual G-index score means across academic titles, within Romanian
Sociology ranking domain
Fig. 6 Comparing individual H-index score means across academic titles, within Romanian
Sociology ranking domain
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Using the individual (nominal) G-index scores calculated for each member of the
Romanian departments of Sociology and PS&IR, we were able to apply Tol’s
formula to compute the successive G-index for each department (Tol 2008).
In Fig. 7, one might investigate the distribution of successive G-index scores for
all the 17 Romanian departments of Sociology and for all the 23 Romanian
departments of PS&IR. As shown, the great majority has successive G-index scores
between one and three, while the top departments (designated by empty triangles
and squares) have successive G-index scores between ﬁve and eleven. This dis-
tribution of scores indicates at least a cleavage between top and ordinary
departments.
Analyzing the raw data reported by the 17 departments of Sociology during the
ofﬁcial University Classiﬁcation and Study Program Ranking Exercise (2011), we
uncovered some useful results for investigating the impact of research funding on
the quality and research productivity. Firstly, there is a positive correlation between
the total funding1 reported by the departments and the total number of publications
Fig. 7 Ranking the Romanian departments of sociology and of political science and international
relations, using G successive index scores
1Ofﬁcial raw data on Romanian university research funding are extremely hard to ﬁnd for aca-
demic purposes. However, we constructed the scale variable total funding by aggregating all the
research funding streams that the 17 sociology departments reported to received during 2006 and
2011. By all the funding streams we understand: state funding, alternative to State national funding
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(e.g. papers, books, book chapters etc.) published between 2006 and 2011
(τ = 0.391, p (2-tailed) = 0.05). There is also a positive correlation between total
number of publications between 2006 and 2011 and public funding2 (τ = 0.477, p
(2-tailed) = 0.05) or private funding streams (non-state funding) (τ = 0.510, p
(2-tailed) = 0.01).
When measuring for the impact of the scientiﬁc productivity, we did not ﬁnd any
relationship between the total funding/public funding/private funding streams
reported by the Sociology departments and the number of citations3 or the
departments’ H and G scores4 (Table 3).
4 Discussion
Our investigation uncovered three key results. Firstly, irrespective of gender or
academic title, half of the scholars from the two academic disciplinary domains
submitted to ranking (i.e. Sociology and PS&IR) published research items (e.g.
papers, books, book chapters etc.) without any scientiﬁc impact (i.e. H and G index
scores of zero). The mode of individual G and H index scores within each academic
Table 3 Results of non-parametric correlations among different types of university department
funding and different types of research productivity impact proxies








Number of citations, computed for publications
printed after 2006
τ = 0.082 τ = 0.301 τ = 0.244
Departmental H index, computed for
publications printed after 2006
τ = 0.099 τ = 0.293 τ = 0.249
Departmental G index, computed for
publications printed after 2006
τ = 0.155 τ = 0.303 τ = 0.335
Note The correlation scores were computed for the University Departments of Sociology (n = 17)
and neither of them was statistically signiﬁcant (p > 0.05, two-tailed)
(Footnote 1 continued)
and international funding. Moreover, the total number of publications was computed at the level of
all Romanian sociology departments (there are 19 departments of sociology, among which
ARACIS accredited only 17).
2Correlation was computed ﬁltering out the private departments that do not receive public funding.
3Using Publish or Perish software, we computed the total number of citations for the publications
published after 2006 by the academic researchers of the 17 Romanian sociology departments.
4We computed departmental H and G scores taking into account publications published after 2006.
We consider the number of citations and the departments’ G and H index scores as proxies for the
impact of scientiﬁc productivity.
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category was zero (i.e. associate professors, lecturers and assistants) except for the
category of professors. Inspecting the data, we detected an extremely small modal
difference between male and female scholars, in terms of G and H index scores.
However, we suspect this difference to be caused by the period spent within the
system and not by other factors (see, for instance, that male scholars tend to occupy
better positions on the academic ladder compared to women).
Secondly, in each of the two disciplinary domains there are a few top depart-
ments that signiﬁcantly outscore the rest. Using departmental G index scores, we
could only discriminate between top departments and ordinary departments
(Fig. 7). For instance, 32 out of the 40 departments are being extremely similar,
having a departmental G index score range of three (minimum one and maximum
four). Moreover, the ordinary departments’ departmental G-index mean is only
19 % out of the best departmental G-index score and only 29 % out of the top
departments’ successive G-index mean.
These two results show that, at least in the ﬁelds of Sociology and of PS&IR,
only a few departments publish scientiﬁc research items that have some impact (e.g.
the maximum departmental G-index score for Sociology domain is 12 and for
PS&IR ranking domain is 10). Unfortunately, we do not have the possibility of
assessing the intensity of this impact, as previous similar studies conducted on the
Romanian higher education do not exist. However, it seems to be highly sensitive
that half of the scholars in each of the two ﬁelds have G and H index scores of zero.
Thirdly, there is no signiﬁcant statistical relationship between the research
funding and the impact of published research items. In this case, research funding
acts only as a major incentive that inflates the number of publications and deflates
their speciﬁc and overall impact. In the broad context of a poor Romanian state and
of an underfunded higher education system, the issue of how to efﬁciently use the
very few ﬁnancial resources available should be explored. For instance, one may
consider whether the public funding mechanisms should be associated with speciﬁc
institutional arrangements so as to competitively direct the funds towards those
departments that publish high impact research items (Fig. 7). As a matter of fact,
this has been the policy option that was implemented after 2011 in the Romanian
higher education system. It is now currently expected that the new institutional
arrangements carry along incentives and procedures that, at least potentially, might
enhance the efﬁcient exploitation of the public ﬁnancial resources.
Even if we have shown that the impact of the scientiﬁc research items published
by the Romanian scholars from the ﬁelds of Sociology and of PS&IR has a low
intensity, our results must be approached with due care. Firstly, our data are rep-
resentative for only two domains of study. This means that we cannot extend our
interpretations and ﬁndings towards other ﬁelds, and particularly for the whole
system. Secondly, the impact of research items published by scholars could also be
measured and assessed using other tools and criteria. Thirdly, we used
mono-dimensional measures (H-index and G-index scores) as proxies to estimate
scientiﬁc impact.
Furthermore, one may question the key assumption adopted in our analysis. We
consider that rankings may prove to be a tool not only for adjusting informational
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asymmetry, but also for addressing the need of increasing the efﬁciency in public
money spending. Such an assumption was adopted for two reasons: (a) to see how
rankings would work within two of the most recently expanding disciplinary areas
of the Romanian system of higher education, and (b) to explore rankings’ eventual
policy consequences in terms of public funding and efﬁcient use of funds in higher
education institutions. Both issues are academically sensitive. Turning rankings into
inter alia funding criteria may have unintended consequences that are questionable
from the perspective of an equitable distribution of public resources, while the same
option may facilitate the generation of those intended consequences which aim to
decrease informational asymmetry for the students, and increase economic efﬁ-
ciency in the use of public funds. The two types of consequences are not necessarily
consistent, and this joins the wide range of critiques towards the use of rankings in
assessing higher education (e.g. different ranking criteria generate different rank-
ings, their methodologies are systematically biased, produce signiﬁcant errors, and
are deemed to ignore creative thinking and teaching, while mainly referring to
research results, etc.). Despite all this, it seems that only by changing the institu-
tional arrangements within the higher education system and introducing different
incentives, the quality of research and academics’ research productivity may stand a
good chance of getting improved, and face the competitive arena of today’s higher
education. Instead of opting for either availability of more public funds or ﬁnancial
efﬁciency while decoupling it from the level of existing academic performances, a
better policy option would be to provide an institutional arrangement which com-
bines ﬁnancial incentives with the demand for an increasing research productivity
and quality.
5 Conclusion
We argued that, at least in the disciplinary ﬁelds of Romanian sociology and
political sciences, the research productivity is highly influenced by additional
ﬁnancial resources. Furthermore, we revealed that the quality of research produc-
tivity (deﬁned by its impact) could be increased by a mixture of two factors:
institutional arrangements (that carry speciﬁc incentives) and additional ﬁnancial
resources.
We claimed that there are two streams of ideas and policies within the Romanian
higher education system: (a) a traditional policy approach according to which
research quality can be improved by a higher rate of public expenditure on research
and teaching; and (b) a post-traditional policy according to which research quality
and productivity may be improved by increasing the level of efﬁciency in spending
public money.
We aimed at questioning the traditional policy (or philosophy), arguing that an
increase in funding is not sufﬁcient for automatically increasing academic quality.
Moreover, it seems obvious that this traditional way of thinking cannot be sup-
ported by any alternative means during periods of economic crisis, when
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governments, more often than not, do not increase their rates of expenditures on
higher education.
In the context of a poor Romanian economy and a heavily underfunded higher
education system, provisioning speciﬁc institutional arrangements to increase the
efﬁciency of exploiting resources could, at least theoretically, improve the quality of
academic research. The reforms provisioned in 2011, as shown, were meant to
introduce new institutional arrangements in areas such as quality assurance, public
funding, academic career, university classiﬁcation and study program rankings.
Their goal has been to bring forth a Mathew effect: top university department
deserve more money.
An illustrative example of how the two above mentioned philosophies operate is
provided by the relationship between public funding and quality and productivity of
research. An increase in the quality of the research items produced by the university
departments could be attained by embracing the principles of the post-traditional
philosophy that grounded the 2011 reforms. Accordingly, after ranking the uni-
versity departments in ﬁve classes, only the better positioned departments in each
ranking domain were to receive public money. This incentive was expected to drive
the poorly performing university departments to increase their quality and research
productivity. Consequently, the ordinary university departments would either
improve their departmental G-index score as to catch up with the top departments,
or identify alternative funding streams as to avoid demise. This incentive was
thought of as introducing competition among university departments toward
improving their quality of teaching and research and their research productivity.
When university departments are different in terms of quality and research pro-
ductivity, publicly and equally funding all departments, irrespective of their per-
formance (e.g. departmental G-index scores), is a clear case of wasting critical
public resources5; especially in cases where the impact of research productivity is
zero. Changing the institutional arrangements and introducing new incentives could
determine organizational change towards increasing academic quality.
Our ﬁndings also indirectly approach some additional topics that, in the future,
may need further work and empirical investigation. Firstly, Romanian academics, at
least from the ﬁeld of sociology and political science, have a considerable
non-academic productivity (e.g. columns in newspapers, ideas shared through
media etc.). Has this non-academic productivity any relevance for various publics,
including the political elites? Should this non-academic productivity be taken into
account in assessing academic work? Secondly, there is a lot of confusion regarding
university departments’ mission. On one hand, academics are required to publish in
high impact scientiﬁc journals, if they were to climb on the academic ladder.
Consequently, measures like the ones mentioned in this paper are highly relevant
and should be used as assessment tools by the university management. On the other
5Irrespective of the provisions of the Law of Education, in 2013, the Romanian Ministry of
Education continues to ﬁnance university departments by the student number and not by the
quality of their research and teaching.
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hand, public funding is allocated on unclear criteria which are expected to stress
also the importance of teaching. While reviewing research criteria, the needs for
having appropriate criteria for teaching are pressing. From this point of view, it
seems that there is a clear case of interest mismatch between policy-makers and
academics (Scott 2010).
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